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# Clitophon: Introduction

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## Place and Time

Dating the *Clitophon* may seem to depend, like much else about the dialogue, on how we understand its relationship to the *Republic*. The *Clitophon* is often associated with the *Republic* because Clitophon is said to have praised the rhetorician Thrasymachus in the *Clitophon*, and he attempts to support the position of Thrasymachus in *Republic* I (340a–b). If the *Clitophon* and *Republic* are to be understood as a dramatic continuity of some sort, the dramatic date that we assign to the *Republic* would automatically apply to the *Clitophon* as well. Even if we want to separate the *Clitophon* from the *Republic* dramatically, we might still avail ourselves of the fact that Clitophon was a known associate of Thrasymachus. But given that Thrasymachus was active in Athens between 430 and 400, this range is not very helpful. Aristotle tells us that Clitophon was politically active in support of votes leading to the establishment of oligarchical power in 411 and 404. The *Athenian Constitution* has him request the consultation of the ancestral laws in both cases. If we connect this fact with his legally positivistic interpretation of Thrasymachus' position in *Republic* I, we might surmise that Plato placed Clitophon in the *Republic* as a known advocate and hence symbolic representation of legal positivism.

Such an employment of character does little to help us with the dramatic date of the *Republic* or the *Clitophon* however; if anything it speaks to the possibility that Plato may have intended no dramatic date for the *Republic*. If the characters are meant to symbolize political or philosophical positions, rather than giving us a clue to the *Republic*'s dramatic date, Plato is free to be as liberal as he chooses with the characters he employs in the dialogue. The dating of the *Republic* is notoriously difficult. The two dramatic dates most often proposed are 421, during the Peace of Nicias (a six year break in the Peloponnesian War), and 411. Given the ambiguities surrounding an

appropriate date, and the near impossibility of all of the speakers in the *Republic* being alive or of the age of reason at the same time, and given Clitophon's minor (even unnecessary) interjection in the *Republic* — he has less than 4 lines in the whole book, making one point about legal positivism — one is inclined to believe that the *Republic* was meant to transcend dramatic dating, and rather to be understood dramatically along lines of setting and the political positions that the characters symbolize.

## Clitophon

Clitophon's reputation in antiquity is as something of a political charlatan, but much of this reputation seems to be the result of guilt by association. Most obvious in this regard is his connection with Thrasymachus, who argues unsuccessfully that justice is the will of the stronger party in *Republic I*, a view that will turn out to be diametrically opposed to the natural view of justice put forth by Socrates in the rest of the *Republic*. Thrasymachus is portrayed as argumentative, eristic, and in possession of all of the stock faults usually associated with the sophists that Socrates combats in many of Plato's dialogues. Whether Clitophon should be thought of as a follower of Thrasymachus or whether he is someone who abandoned Socrates for Thrasymachus is questionable. We know that Clitophon did consult with Thrasymachus, but that he was a convert or orthodox student of Thrasymachus seems unlikely, when one considers that Thrasymachus rejects Clitophon's attempt to defend the theory put forth by the rhetorician in *Republic I*. More importantly, in the *Clitophon*, Clitophon speaks of consulting with Thrasymachus *and others*, which hardly makes him a convert or orthodox follower of Thrasymachus.

Clitophon was regarded by Plutarch as someone who could not be turned in the right direction by Socrates and Plato. He is pegged as a wayward student in the same breath as Alcibiades, the brilliant but corrupt young military general, whose escapades contributed to Socrates' reputation as a corrupter of youth. It is Alcibiades who speaks highly of Socrates in a drunken encomium at the end of the *Symposium* (212c–223d), and about whom two dialogues of disputed provenance have been transmitted with the Platonic corpus since antiquity. Plutarch's mention of Clitophon and Alcibiades (*Moralia* 328a–c) as men that could not be saved by Plato and Socrates, as damning as it appears, presumably relies heavily on his reading of the *Clitophon*; Plutarch offers no historical reason for why Clitophon could not be saved by Socrates and Plato, and hence we can only assume that this is based on his negative

understanding of the *Clitophon*, and possibly Clitophon's perceived association with Thrasymachus.

The comic playwright Aristophanes makes Clitophon an associate of the controversial and reputedly opportunistic general Theramenes in his play *The Frogs* (965–967). Theramenes was a supporter of the oligarchical movements in 411 and 404; Clitophon's two actions reported in the *Athenian Constitution* support votes that would turn out to be instrumental in establishing oligarchical power. However while Clitophon associated with Theramenes, there is scant evidence regarding the nature or closeness of the association. The thrust of his actions in both 411 and 404 are consistent, insofar as both times he suggests that the ancestral law must be consulted. This in turn is consistent with the legal positivism he displays in Plato's *Republic*.

If we read the *Clitophon* independently of what we know of his historical personage, there is no indication of any of this. All we see is someone who has been convinced by Socrates that he must be deeply invested in justice and caring for one's soul, but who is in the throes of confusion about how to do so.

## Argumentum

The *Clitophon* is brief, and not really a dialogue, but more of a tirade on the part of Clitophon, a harangue against Socrates, that proceeds along rhetorical lines to articulate an understanding of Socrates' protreptic methodology. The opening has an abruptness reminiscent of the *Meno*. Socrates says to Clitophon that he heard from Lysias (the brother of Polemarchus who is present but does not speak in the *Republic*) that Clitophon praised Thrasymachus and criticized Socrates. Clitophon tries to placate Socrates to a degree by saying that he found Socrates to be awe-inspiring when he offered up protreptic or exhortative discourses to crowds, urging them to seek justice and care for their souls.

This praise and admiration for Socrates carries with it overtones of Alcibiades' speech in the *Symposium*, yet it quickly turns to exasperation at Socrates' inability or unwillingness to forge beyond mere exhortation and actually tell Clitophon what to do, and what justice is, now that he has taken up the Socratic call to seek justice and care for his soul. Because Socrates cannot or will not provide him with an answer, Clitophon consults with Thrasymachus and anyone else he can. The dialogue concludes with Clitophon saying that he praises Socrates highly for his exhortation to justice, but ends with the charge that Socrates is actually an impediment to finding happiness once people have taken up the exhortation.

## Authenticity, Protreptic, and Socratic Philosophy

The *Clitophon* ends with either a threat by Clitophon to leave Socrates and join forces with Thrasymachus, or an explanation of why he consults with Thrasymachus already (more about this ambiguity will emerge in what follows). At *Republic* 340a–b, Clitophon speaks once in an attempt to defend Thrasymachus' position, an attempt challenged by Polemarchus, and rejected by Thrasymachus himself. Again this connection between Thrasymachus and Clitophon suggests a connection between the *Clitophon* and *Republic* I, the nature of which is far from clear. If we accept a dramatic connection between the *Republic* and *Clitophon*, two possibilities emerge. Either the *Clitophon* dramatically precedes the *Republic*, or it dramatically follows *Republic* I.

As for the first possibility, placing the *Clitophon* before the *Republic* in dramatic sequence would suggest either that Clitophon is a wayward student who has turned his back on philosophy and cannot be saved by Socrates, or that Socratic philosophy drives people to unsavoury rhetoricians like Thrasymachus. This might then lead to a reading of the *Clitophon* that implies Plato's own dissatisfaction with aporetic and protreptic philosophy found in many Socratic dialogues, motivating him to write a constructive account of justice in the *Republic*. This kind of reading would be strengthened by the idea that Clitophon issues a threat to depart Socrates and join Thrasymachus, but (as will be discussed) there is a significant reason to doubt that there is such a threat.

The second possibility of a dramatic connection places the *Clitophon* after *Republic* I but before *Republic* II–X, since Clitophon's main complaint in the *Clitophon* is that Socrates has nothing positive to say about justice, a claim which hardly makes sense after Socrates embarks on the long task of creating a psyche writ large in order to seek a definition of justice, a definition stated quite explicitly at *Republic* 443c–d. A tantalizing idea is that the dramatic setting of the *Clitophon* is one where Socrates and Clitophon are alone in the portico of the house of Polemarchus in the Piraeus (the setting of the conversation that forms the *Republic*). The suggestion is that after the conversation that forms *Republic* I has ended, Clitophon is praising Thrasymachus' performance, and criticizing Socrates' performance in that conversation. It is noteworthy that *Republic* II opens with a criticism of Socrates on this very point — Plato's brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus criticize Socrates for not arguing very convincingly against Thrasymachus (*Republic* 357a–b). Hence one might imagine that the *Clitophon* was written with the intention of following *Republic* I, but cut out in later editions. This however would require that the *Clitophon* be a fragmentary outtake from the *Republic*, whereas its form and style are certainly that of a complete piece.

That Clitophon says he goes to Thrasymachus at *Clitophon* 410c is important. The Greek codices employed by Marsilio Ficino in his famous Latin *Platonis Opera* of 1484 show signs of a later hand changing the Greek *poreuomai* (suggesting “I go to Thrasymachus”) to *poreusomai* (“I shall go to Thrasymachus”), turning an account of why Clitophon consults with Thrasymachus (*poreuomai*) into a threat to do so (*poreusomai*). Ficino renders this in the future (*conferam*, “I shall go”) in his Latin translation, and modern English translations are divided equally among future and present tense renderings of the phrase. Yet there is no ground for the future tense, grammatically, contextually or paleographically. Moreover, as already noted, Clitophon says that he consults with Thrasymachus *and others* — whomever he can — and so even if there is a threat, it is not threat to abandon Socrates for Thrasymachus alone, it is a threat to seek help from him and others.

The change in tense at 410c contributes to the ambiguity as to whether Clitophon is threatening to cross the floor from philosophy to rhetoric or sophistry, or is merely explaining his own reasons for already consulting (sometimes) with Thrasymachus and others. The deeper implications of this subtle difference are wide ranging. If the threat did exist, and were it a threat to join forces with Thrasymachus, it would seem to have been followed up in *Republic* I where Clitophon appears to be taking Thrasymachus’ side, despite the fact that Thrasymachus rejects the help that Clitophon offers. Were the threat actually there, however, one might be tempted to read the *Clitophon* as Plato’s own dissatisfaction with Socratic philosophy, and the *Republic* as his departure from Socrates to a more constructive approach to philosophy, one that extends beyond mere aporia and protreptic.

On such lines of interpretation, we are forced to consider that the dialogue may represent Plato’s dissatisfaction with Socratic philosophy. However, since not everyone is of the opinion that Plato wrote the *Clitophon*, we may also need to consider that the *Clitophon* expresses someone else’s dissatisfaction with Socratic philosophy. The authenticity of the dialogue has been disputed for some time. However, there are no good reasons to question the *Clitophon*’s authenticity. A considerable part of the suspicion surrounding the dialogue can be traced back to another glitch in the Ficino translations. In his *Platonis Opera*, Ficino writes, without explanation, that the dialogue was perhaps not written by Plato. This opinion was retracted by his editor, but never removed from subsequent editions, and this has cast a long shadow of doubt over the dialogue. Other reasons that contribute to the dialogue’s dubious status have to do with the failure to recognize the often under-appreciated role of philosophical protreptic in Socratic/Platonic philosophy.

Protreptic is a rhetorical attempt to convince men that they need to be

virtuous, that it is important to their lives to understand virtue, and this is something that must be done before the work of understanding virtue or attaining virtue can be taken on. Protreptic plays a key role in the Socratic mission. Socrates urges men to care for their souls more than their possessions in the *Apology* (30a–b). Alcibiades speaks in the highest terms of Socrates' protreptic style in the *Symposium* (215a–222c). Socrates offers a display of impromptu protreptic discourse in the *Euthydemus* (278d–282e), a dialogue in which two sophists show a complete lack of competence in what Socrates considers to be the first step in teaching virtue, namely the protreptic art of convincing people to follow virtue. When we come to the *Clitophon*, we see that Clitophon praises Socrates for his abilities in the area of protreptic. Failure to notice that Socrates engages quite a bit in protreptic discourse can make the Socrates described in the *Clitophon* appear somewhat different from Plato's other portrayals of him. This is because most of Socrates' attempts to get people to seek virtue are implicitly protreptic, as opposed to explicitly protreptic. The general working of Socratic dialogues is such that the characters in the dialogue, as well as the reader, are meant to be placed in a state of confusion about a philosophical concept, and to be inspired (implicitly exhorted) to seek a deeper understanding of that concept. That protreptic devices are at play is rarely stated explicitly. The *Clitophon* seems to offer a more explicit interpretation of the protreptic methodology that is implicit in Socratic methodology generally. *Republic* I, read from the standpoint of protreptic methodology, is propaedeutic to the larger quest for justice that ensues in *Republic* II–X. *Republic* I is an aporetic, implicitly protreptic call to arms in the search for justice, one that Socrates takes up with Plato's courageous warrior brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus as his lieutenants.

Protreptic is a necessary initial tool in the Socratic arsenal, one that is too often overlooked in our readings of Plato. It is so overlooked, in fact, that we can be confused when we see Socratic protreptic so explicitly expressed in a dialogue like the *Clitophon*. It also leads to confusion about how to read and understand what is being expressed in the *Clitophon*. If we accept that confusion or *aporia* is meant to have protreptic impact, and observe that Clitophon is confused and that the dialogue ends with a poignant literary portrayal of the depths of that confusion, there is little mystery to the apparent strangeness of the *Clitophon*, and little reason to question its authenticity. Plato has written, in what follows, essentially a paean to protreptic, that essential preparatory stage in Platonic ethical philosophy.

— G. S. B.

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# Clitophon

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*Translated by Geoffrey S. Bowe*

SOCRATES: It has come to my attention that, in a conversation with Lysias,<sup>1</sup> Clitophon, son of Aristonymos, criticized spending time with Socrates, and praised, above all, spending time with Thrasymachus.<sup>2</sup> 406

CLITOPHON: Whoever it was, Socrates, gave you a false account of what I said to Lysias. While I criticized you for some things, I praised you for some things as well. Since it is clear that you now criticize me, while pretending that you could care less, I would be most happy to go over what I said myself, since now we are alone, so that you don't think that I think ill of you. Perhaps you did not hear correctly, and as a result you are harsher with me than you should be. If you allow me to speak, I would gladly do so, for I want to explain. 407

SOCRATES: Well, since you are eager to benefit me, it would be wrong to

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<sup>1</sup>*Lysias* (ca. 445–380), was the son of Cephalus, a wealthy metic (foreign resident) who owned a weapons factory in the Piraeus (the port of Athens), and the brother of Polemarchus. Cephalus and Polemarchus are the first two interlocutors in Plato's *Republic*. Lysias was a famous orator and lawyer, who offered to write Socrates' defense on charges of religious impiety and corrupting the youth, an offer which Socrates declined. In ca. 430 he went to Thuri with Polemarchus to join a colony there. He visited Athens in 418–16, and returned permanently ca. 412. After Polemarchus was executed by the Thirty Tyrants in 404, Lysias fled to Megara where he funded an army of mercenaries to fight on the side of the democracy. These forces defeated the army led by Plato's uncle Critias, who died in the final battle at the Temple of Bendis in the Piraeus in 403. Lysias is mentioned as present in the conversation taking place at the house of his brother Polemarchus in the *Republic* but does not say anything. His speech on love is discussed by Socrates and Phaedrus in the dialogue that bears the latter's name (*Phaedrus* 230e–234c).

<sup>2</sup>*Thrasymachus of Chalcedon* (b. ca. 455). Chalcedon is on the mouth of the Bosphorus (Boğaziçi) in what is now Istanbul. He was an innovative rhetorician and professional teacher. In Plato's *Republic*, he is the third speaker, and argues that justice is the advantage of the stronger party. Clitophon interprets his statements along legally positivistic grounds, an interpretation that Thrasymachus rejects. His inflammatory style is remarked upon by Socrates in the *Phaedrus* (267c-d), and Socrates suggests that neither Thrasymachus nor Lysias are the right models for acquiring rhetorical skill. In both the *Republic* (337d) and the *Phaedrus* (266c), his eagerness to make money is commented upon.

walk away. Clearly I will come to know my good points and bad points, so that I can seek and practice the former and avoid the latter with all my strength.

CLITOPHON: Then listen. I have often been amazed to hear you conversing with others, and it seemed to me that you spoke far better than anyone else in railing against men, saying again and again, like a god on the tragic stage:<sup>3</sup>

- b “O Men, where are you going? You spend all of your time chasing money and are ignorant of that which is truly important. As a result you fail to ensure that your sons, to whom you will bequeath your wealth, will know how to use it justly. You do not seek teachers of justice for them, if indeed justice can be taught, nor do you find someone to train and exercise them in justice if that is how justice is acquired. You haven’t even begun to provide this for yourselves!
- c Once instructed in letters, music and gymnastics,<sup>4</sup> you consider yourselves and your kin to have received a complete education in virtue, yet you are still vicious when it comes to money. How is it that you neither despise this present system of education, nor seek someone who can put a stop to this empty way of life? It is because of this disharmony, and not because you are out of step with the lyre,<sup>5</sup> that brother is pitted against brother and city against city,
- d quarreling most acrimoniously, suffering and perpetrating the worst kind of evils in war. But you claim that the unjust are unjust voluntarily, and not through want of education. At the same time you have the audacity to say how disgraceful and god-hated injustice is. How could people choose this kind of evil voluntarily? You say that pleasure controls them. Isn’t such servitude involuntary? Thus the statement shows, in every way, that an unjust act is
- e involuntary, and as such all men must be more vigilant in private and cities must be more vigilant in public.”

Socrates, when I hear you saying these things so often, I am overwhelmed, and I praise you with great reverence. The same goes for what you say after this, that those who care for their bodies and neglect their souls make a similar

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<sup>3</sup>The Greek for “like a god on the tragic stage” is *hōsper epi mēchanēs tragikēs theos*, literally “like a god in a tragedy basket,” a reference to a mechanical device whereby a basket was attached to an arm that swung out above the stage. In the basket was an actor dressed as a god. Later literary criticism used the Latin phrase *deus ex machina* — god from the machine — to speak of implausible plot difficulties that were solved in the nick of time by the appearance of the god.

<sup>4</sup>Education in classical Athens consisted of *gymnastikē* (general education in physical fitness), and *mousikē* (instruction in music, lyric poetry and especially Homeric literature). Moral training is thus heavily grounded in Homer, something which Socrates criticizes explicitly in the *Republic*, and implicitly in the *Euthyphro*.

<sup>5</sup>A lyre is a musical instrument similar to a harp but small enough to be held in the hand and played with a plectrum. Its music accompanies lyric poetry. The point here seems to be that those who are morally lacking are not so because they have not obtained the traditional education, but that the traditional education itself is lacking.



error, ignoring the part that should rule, and heeding what should be ruled. The same goes for when you say that if someone doesn't know how to use something, it would be better for him not to use it; if someone doesn't know how to use his eyes or ears or the whole of his body, it would be better for him not to hear or see, or use his body at all than to use it any which way. Similarly, he who does not know how to use his lyre does not know how to use his neighbor's either, for if he doesn't know how to use another's he can't use his own, or any other instrument or possession.<sup>6</sup> And the conclusion of your argument is excellent, that for he who doesn't know how to use his soul, it would be better that he bring his soul to peace and not live, rather than live according to his own whim. If he must live, it would be better for him to live his life as a slave than to be a free man, and he should hand over the rudder of the ship that is his mind to another, one who has learned the art of captaining men,<sup>7</sup> that which you, Socrates, often call politics, and which you also call the art of judgment and justice. 408

These and other like arguments are numerous and exceedingly eloquent, about the teaching of virtue and how it is necessary to care for oneself above all else, I am pretty sure I have never opposed, nor do I suspect that I shall ever oppose them in the future. I regard these as exhortations most valuable, indeed as waking us up from our slumber. So I made up my mind to learn to what comes next, although I did not question you at first Socrates. Instead I asked your peers, or followers, or companions, or whatever one is supposed to call the relationship that they have with you. Of these I questioned the ones whom you hold in the highest regard, asking them about the next step in your argument, and questioning them in your fashion. "O best of men," I said, "what do we do with this exhortation to virtue that Socrates has given us? Should we merely accept that this is all there is, without looking into the matter or following it through? Is our life's work to consist of nothing more than producing protreptic for the un-exhorted, so that they in turn can exhort others? Or if we agree with Socrates and with each other that this is exactly what we should do, shouldn't we then ask the question 'what next'? It's as if we were children who knew nothing of gymnastics and medicine and someone

<sup>6</sup>This comparison of knowing how to use the body and knowing how to use the soul, with the exception of the lyre, seems to come from *Republic* I (352e–353e).

<sup>7</sup>The idea of captaining men is a commonplace; one can't help but recall Socrates' analogy between of captaining a ship to philosopher rulers in the *Republic* (488a–489b). In the *Euthydemus* (292c), the politician's art is said to make people good and wise; in the *Gorgias* (464b), justice is caring for the soul; in the *Sophist* (309c–d) the "kingly art" is said to provide true opinions about the fine, just, and good, and their opposites. Later in the *Clitophon* (409d–e), one of Socrates' followers is depicted as saying that justice produces friendship in the cities, which is knowledge, not opinion.

exhorts us to care for our bodies, chastising us and saying how shameful it is that we spend all of our energy tending wheat and barley and vines and all of the good things the body needs, but that we do not seek out an art or a device that would make the body the best it can be, although there are such things.

409 If we say to him, ‘say what these arts are’, perhaps he would reply that they are gymnastics and medicine. So now, can you tell me the art of virtue for the soul?” The one who seemed to be the best at these questions said to me that it is the art which you hear Socrates speaking of, namely justice. I replied, “Don’t just tell me the name, tell me like this: They say that medicine is an art. And it has two products, the continual production of new doctors, and health. Of these products, what we call health is no longer really an art, but rather the effect of the art which teaches it and is taught about it. Similarly, the products of the carpenter’s work are either a house or carpentry, and the house is the effect of teaching carpentry. The same can be said about justice, namely that it produces just men, like the products of other artisans, but as for the other, the work that the just man can do for us, what do we say this is? Tell me.”

c This man, I think, replied “the expedient,” and another said “the necessary,” another said “the beneficial,” and yet another said “the advantageous.” So I reformulated my question and said, “But these names can be applied to each of the arts, acting correctly, seeking advantage, benefit and the like; but what each art aims at is dictated by the particular art in question. For example, d carpentry dictates what is right, good and necessary for the production of furniture, although furniture itself is not an art. Let justice be explained in this fashion. Finally, Socrates, one of your followers answered me, saying something which seemed quite elegant. He said that the specific task of justice, which belongs to no other art, was producing friendship in cities. When pressed on this, he claimed that friendship was always good and never bad, and when asked about what we call the friendship of children and animals, he said that he didn’t consider these to be friendships at all, for what follows from these e is more often bad than good. To avoid this, he claimed that these are not friendships, and those who call them by that name, name them falsely. In reality and truth, friendship is the purest harmony. When asked whether this harmony was harmony of opinion or harmony of knowledge, he rejected harmony of opinion, since necessarily many harmful things result from the harmony of men’s opinions; since he agreed that friendship was a completely good thing and the task of justice, he said that this harmony was the harmony of knowledge, not opinion.

410 At this point in our argument we fell into confusion, and those listening were able to criticize him and say that the argument had circled back to the

beginning. They said, “Medicine is also a harmony, just like all of the arts, and they are capable of stating what they are about, but this justice or harmony of which you speak has no idea what it’s about, and it is unclear what its task is.”

And so, Socrates, I finally asked you the question, and you told me that justice involves harming enemies and helping friends. But later it appeared that the just man never harms anyone, since everything he does aims at benefiting everyone.<sup>8</sup> Well, after persisting in this, not just once or twice, but for a long time, I gave up, thinking to myself that you were better than other men in rehearsing accolades of virtue, but that one of two things must be true: either you are capable of this, and nothing more than this, which is something that can happen in any art — for example, someone who is not a captain can become quite skilled in praising captaining as something which is very valuable to men, and so too with other arts. So someone might charge you with acting like this regarding justice, and say that just because you praise justice so well, it does not make you an expert in justice. Not that this is what I think, but one of two things must be true: either you don’t know, or you don’t want to share your knowledge with me. I am confused, and it seems to me that this is why I go<sup>9</sup> to Thrasymachus, and anyone else I can. But if you are ready to stop handing me these exhortations — look, if you were to exhort me about say, gymnastics, and say that I should not neglect my body, you would then go beyond exhortation and explain the nature of the body and how it must be cared for. Do the same thing in this present case. Assume that Clitophon agrees that it is absurd to care for other things, while neglecting the soul, that for the sake of which we work so hard. And put next to that all of the other things that I’ve just said. I beg you to do nothing else, so that I don’t have to do what I do at present, praising you to Lysias and others, but criticizing you as well. For I will say, Socrates, that to a man who has not yet been exhorted by you, you are of the highest value, but to someone who has been exhorted, you are almost an impediment to attaining the goal of virtue and becoming

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<sup>8</sup>Socrates never seems to maintain anywhere that justice is helping friends and harming enemies. In the *Republic*, it is Polemarchus who puts forth the idea (attributed to Simonides) that “justice is giving everyone his due” (331e), which is subsequently interpreted to mean helping friends and harming enemies (332b). At *Meno* 71e, Meno claims that virtue is benefiting friends and harming enemies. Socrates flatly rejects this Greek commonplace, arguing that it is never just to harm anyone (*Republic* 335e). The rejection of this concept of justice is also implied in the *Crito* (49c–e), as something that Socrates has always maintained.

<sup>9</sup>All three extant manuscripts of the *Clitophon* have *poreuomai* (I go) with a later hand in ms A inserting *poreusomai* (I shall go). But the use of *poreusomai* is inept. Much has been made of the idea that Clitophon is threatening to defect to Thrasymachus here, but it seems that this passage cannot provide textual corroboration for the claim.

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<sup>10</sup>Cf. the last line of *Republic* I: “If I don’t know what justice is, I can’t really know whether it’s a kind of virtue or not, or whether one who has it in his possession is happy or unhappy” (354c).